Quotes

On Solving Philosophical Puzzles

Published on October 2nd, 2009.

Consider the practice of a few leading analytic philosophy journals of issuing challenges to readers to solve intellectual puzzles. I do not demean the value of those puzzles, but the intellectual virtue cultivated by such a practice is not philosophical wisdom. It is cleverness–primped and polished to be sure, but only cleverness. . . .

One might argue that puzzle solvers take as their goal the seeking of philosophical truth. I grant that the puzzle solvers are after philosophical truth. But here we can make a distinction between philosophical propositions whose truth-value is important to know and philosophical propositions whose truth-value is not important to know. Earlier I referred to the claim about angels having wings as an example of a philosophical proposition that was not intrinsically important. It seems to me the contemporary analogues of such a medieval question are sometimes found in puzzle notices. Though I expect this point will make me an equal-opportunity gadfly to both historical and analytic philosophers, the two sorts of questions serve precisely the same purpose: to sharpen analytic thinking. Divorced from any greater concern with philosophical systematicity, responses to such puzzles are sly abstractions whose importance rests primarily in the exercise and development of one’s analytical tools. Their content is often beside the point.

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Ryan Nichols, “Why is the History of Philosophy Worth Our Study?” in Metaphilosophy 37:1 (2006), 49-50.

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